We present a new model for cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree problems, so that the planner can identify the agents that merge. Under this new framework, and as opposed to the traditional model, there exist rules that satisfy merge-proofness. Besides, by strengthening this property and adding some other properties, such as population-monotonicity and solidarity, we characterize a unique rule that coincides with the weighted Shapley value of an associated cost game.
Introduction
Problems in which supply network formation is involved have been widely studied in the literature from two different points of view. On one hand, the design of efficient algorithms and the computational complexity. On the other hand, the cost sharing of the network.
In situations where the supply can be done either directly or though other nodes, the optimal network is a tree. Examples include water supply, electricity, cable television, Internet, and so on.
In order to study these situations, two steps should be considered: in the first one, agents will construct a minimal cost tree, mt for short. There exist several algorithms for building a mt. Two of them are provided by Kruskal (1956) and Prim (1957) , respectively. Once we have constructed a mt, the second step consists of dividing its cost between the nodes that benefit from it. In order to do that, a rule will be used.
In this paper, we focus on the cost sharing aspect. In particular, we study minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situations. A group of agents, located at different geographical points, want some particular service or good which can only be provided by a common supplier, called the source. Agents can be served through connections which entail some cost and they do not care about whether they are connected directly or indirectly to the source.
There is a large literature on the cost-sharing related problem. Bird (1976) uses Prim's algorithm and proposes a cost allocation rule, the so-called Bird rule. He also associates a cooperative game with each mcst problem. Huberman (1981, 1984) study the core and the nucleolus of this cooperative game. Feltkamp et al. (1994) use Kruskal's algorithm in order to define a rule, the folk rule, which has been redefined and characterized in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007a,b) . The definition of the folk rule in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007b) is as the Shapley value of a particular game associated to the problem. Other authors also use the Shapley value in order to define rules. Kar (2002) studies the Shapley value of the cooperative game defined by Bird (1976) . Trudeau (2012) defines the cycle-complete rule as the Shapley value of a another particular game. Dutta and Kar (2004) propose another different rule.
A relevant approach is to study which desirable properties are satisfied by the different rules. Properties should help a planner to compare different rules and to decide which rule is preferred in a particular case.
In this paper, we focus on three important classes of properties. The first class is based on the property of core selection. This property states that no group of agents should subsidize the other agents, paying more than the cost of connecting themselves to the source. This is a very relevant property in the economic literature. A typical drawback is that, in general, the core may be empty. However, it happens to be always non-empty in the game associated to a mcst problem. In fact, most of the rules proposed in the literature satisfy core-selection, with the remarkable exception of the one derived from the Shapley value of the associated game (see Kar (2002) ). A stronger version of core selection is population monotonicity, which requires that the cost allocated to any agent will not decrease if new agents join the society. Population monotonicity in mcst problems has been studied by Bergantiños and Gómez-Rúa (2010) , Vidal-Puga (2007a, 2009 ), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010) , Lorenzo-Freire (2009), and Norde et al. (2004) .
The second class is based on the property of cost monotonicity. This property implies that the cost allocated to some node will not increase if the cost of a link involving this node goes down, nothing else changing.
Hence, a violation of this appealing property could disincentive the agents to reduce the costs of constructing links (see Dutta and Kar (2004) ). A stronger version of cost monotonicity requires that the cost allocated to any agent will not increase if the cost of any link (involving this player or not) goes down, nothing else changing. Hence, this strong version would also prelude the agents to sabotage the construction of any link. This stronger version of cost monotonicity in mcst problems has been studied, among others, in Bergantiños and Gómez-Rúa (2010) , Vidal-Puga (2007a, 2009 ), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010) , and Trudeau (2012) .
There have been studied several rules that satisfy both population monotonicity and cost monotonicity. In particular, the folk rule is the only of these rules that satisfies both properties (see Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2008) ).
For a characterization of rules satisfying both properties, see Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2015) .
The third class is based on the properties of split and merge-proofness.
The split-proofness property implies that one node should not have incentives to split into two or more different nodes. The merge-proofness property implies that two or more nodes should not have incentives to merge into a single node. These properties are relevant in situations where the identity of the nodes is ambiguous. For example, different departments on a University campus can be already connected by an internal network. In case they want to be connected to a wider supply network, should they be considered as a single node (the campus) or as several different nodes (the departments) connected at zero cost? Other examples are the different shops at the mall, apartments on a building, or houses in a residential area.
Merge-proofness preludes the agents to build an inefficient network, as next example shows: Example 1.1 Consider three agents located respectively at nodes 1, 2 and 3. The connection costs are depicted in Figure 1 (left). Figure 1 (right) represents the same situation after agents 2 and 3 merge, paying cost 8.
This merging is inefficient, because the three agents end up paying no less than 8 + 28 = 36, whereas the initial problem has an optimal tree with cost 34. Assume a rule assigns Φ = (Φ 1 , Φ 2 , Φ 3 ) in the initial problem, and
2 ) in the second one. Then, a merge-proof rule should satisfy Φ 2 + Φ 3 ≤ 8 + Φ ′ 2 . Inefficiency due to a previous merge of nodes 2 and 3 is then avoided.
The properties of split and merge-proofness have been studied in many contexts related to cost sharing problems. In a context where the agents consume arbitrary quantities of possibly different goods, Sprumont (2005) characterizes the Aumann-Shapley cost sharing method, used to distribute the total generated cost that ensures that agents never find it profitable to split or to merge their consumptions. O'Neill (1982) , Chun (1988 ), De Frutos (1999 , Moulin (2002) , Ju (2003) , and Ju et al. (2007) study split and merge-proofness in claim and bankruptcy problems. Moulin (2007 Moulin ( , 2008 ) also studies split and merge-proofness in the context of job scheduling. Merging in exchange economies has been studied for several solution concepts by Hart (1974) , Postlewaite and Rosenthal (1974) , Maschler (1976) , Legros (1987) and Rosenmüller and Sudhölter (2004) . Merging and splitting in cooperative games have also been studied by Knudsen and Østerdal (2012) and references herein.
In the context of mcst problems, the folk rule satisfies split-proofness and, moreover, it is not difficult to derive a split-proof rule from a costmonotonic one. However, this is not the case with merge-proofness. Under domain restrictions 1 , the Bird rule satisfies merge-proofness (seeÖzsoy (2006), Athanassoglou and Sethuraman (2008) , and Gómez-Rúa and VidalPuga (2011)). The Bird rule is, moreover, the only relevant rule defined in the literature that satisfies it (see Gómez-Rúa and Vidal-Puga (2011) ) at least as much as to players 1 and 3 in the original problem, whereas it should assign to player 2 (say Φ ′ 2 ) at least as much as to players 2 and 3 in the original problem. This means
The key issue in the previous example is that the planner has no way to know whether agent 3 has merged with agent 1 or with agent 2. This assumption is necessary in situations where the agents may use multiple replicas without being detected, as for example the case of users of a web page. However, this may not be a reasonable assumption in many other situations. In the mcst model, one may think in the case of departments in a campus or apartments in a building. In case the planner knows which mergers may have taken place, it is not difficult to derive a merge-proof rule 2 . On the other hand, it is not clear whether a merge-proof rule could also satisfy core selection and cost monotonicity 3 .
In this paper, we model the mcst situation in such a way that the planner knows which mergers take place. If some agents merge and present themselves to the planner in this way, she should solve a situation where the nodes are formed by the union of several agents. We refer to this new problem as a (mcst) situation. A mcst situation generalizes the classical mcst problem.
Under this model, all the rules presented in the literature fail at least one of the properties. However, we propose a new rule that satisfies all of them, even the stronger versions. This rule is the weighted Shapley value of a particular cooperative game 4 . We also propose a characterization result of this rule with these and other properties. The other properties used in the characterization are efficient merging, piece-wise additivity, symmetry and positivity.
Positivity says that each node should pay at least zero. It has been used, and Hougaard et al. (2010) . Piece-wise additivity says that when the same network is optimal for two different cost matrices, then the cost-sharing is additive in the cost function.
Efficient merging, on the other hand, is related to the properties of split and merge-proofness. Even though merge-proofness precludes agents to build an inefficient network (as in Example 1.1), this concern is no longer relevant when the nodes that merge are already the closest ones (as in Example 1.2).
Efficient Merging says that these nodes should not find harmful to join in advance in these cases.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the model.
In Section 3 we describe some desirable properties of the rules. In Section 4 we define a new rule, prove that it satisfies all these properties and characterize it with some of them. In Section 5 we prove that this rule is the weighted Shapley value of a particular transferable-utility game. In Section 6 we present some conclusions.
The model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of potential agents, n > 2, and let 0 be a special point called the source. Let N 0 = N ∪ {0}. A minimum cost spanning tree problem is determined by a cost function c :
We assume that some agents in N want to be connected to the source, and they are indifferent between connecting directly or through other agents.
The cost of direct connection between any pair of agents, or between any agent and the source, is given by c. Moreover, some groups of agents can be connected in advance, so that they behave as a single nodes. Hence, these nodes are groups of agents.
A minimum cost spanning tree situation, or simply a situation, of a cost function c, is a pair P, c P where P = {P 0 , P 1 , ..., P m } is a subset of mutually exclusive subsets of N 0 (i.e. P r ∩ P s = ∅ when r = s) with 0 ∈ P 0 , and c P : P × P → R + is a function that assigns to each pair of (unsorted) subsets in P the minimum cost of connecting any pair of agents of their respective group, that is, c P (P r , P s ) = min i∈Pr,j∈Ps c (i, j) for all P r , P s ∈ P. Each P r ∈ P is a node.
For simplicity, we write (P, c) instead of P, c P . Moreover, and when there is no possible confusion, we write r, s instead of P r , P s , and so on.
Notice that we write 0 instead of P 0 , since it plays the role of the source in a given situation.
We denote as E P = {{r, s} : r, s ∈ P, r = s} the set of edges in P. A graph g in P is a subset of E P . The cost of a graph g in (P, c) is defined as
We denote as G P the set of graphs in (P, c).
A path in (P, c) is a sequence (r 0 , ..., r k ) of different nodes in P. In particular, we say that (r 0 , ..., r k ) is a path between r 0 and r k . We say that a path (r 0 , . . . , r k ) is in a graph g in P if {r l−1 , r l } ∈ g for all l = 1, ..., k.
A spanning graph in P is a graph g in P such that for all r, s ∈ P, there exists a path in P, c P between r and s. We denote as SG P the set of spanning graphs in P.
A rule Φ is a function that assigns to each (P, c) a vector
A spanning tree in P is a graph t in P such that for all r, s ∈ P, there exists a unique path in P between r and s. If t is a spanning tree, we usually write t = {(r, r 0 )} r∈P\{0} , where r 0 represents the first node in the unique path in t from r to the source. We denote as ST P the set of spanning trees in (P, c).
Since c (r, s) ≥ 0 for all (r, s) ∈ E P , it is clear that we can replace SG P with ST P in the definition of rule. Such a minimal cost spanning tree is called a minimal tree, mt for short. A minimal tree always exists, even though it is not necessarily unique. We denote as MT (P, c), MT P for short, the set of minimal trees in (P, c). We denote the cost associated with any mt on (P, c)
as m (P, c).
For any (P, c), a connected component is a maximal subset of P where all the nodes can be connected at zero cost, that is, for any two nodes r, s in the same connected component, there exists a path (r 0 , . . . , r k ) between r and s such that c (r l−1 , r l ) = 0 for all l = 1, . . . , k. Clearly, the connected components determine a partition P of P which includes exactly one set S 0 of nodes that are connected to the source at zero cost. We assume 0 ∈ S 0 so that S 0 = ∅.
Properties of the rules
In this section we describe the properties that we consider a cost sharing rule should satisfy. Most of them are well-known in the classical model of mcst problems and we adapt them to the new context. We also propose a new one. Now we present them in a formal way. Let Φ be a generic rule.
Core Selection: For each Q ⊂ P \ {0}, we have
This property says that no subset of coalitions can find it cheaper to create their own network without the others.
Population Monotonicity: For each r, s ∈ P \ {0}, we have
This property says that if the population of agents decreases, nobody is better off. Equivalently, if the population of agents increases, nobody is worse off.
It is straightforward to check that Population Monotonicity implies Core Selection.
Cost Monotonicity: For each i ∈ P r ∈ P, Φ r (P, c) is non-decreasing on
This property says that if a connection cost increases for coalition r and the rest of the connection costs remain the same, then coalition r is not better off.
The following property is a stronger version of Cost Monotonicity.
This property says that if a connection cost increases and the rest of connection costs remain the same, then no coalition is better off.
It is clear that Solidarity implies Cost Monotonicity.
Positivity: Φ(P, c) only takes non-negative values.
This property says that no agent can be compensated by connecting to the source.
Merge-Proofness: For each Q ⊂ P \ {0} and g ∈ SG Q , we have
where q = r∈Q r (or P q = Pr∈Q P r ).
This property says that no group of coalitions have incentives to join a priori, assuming the cost (given by c(g)), to be treated as a single node.
Strong Merge-Proofness: For each Q ⊂ P \ {0}, and s ∈ (P \ Q) \ {0}, we have
This property says that if a group of coalitions (Q) join in advance in order to be treated as a single node (q), no other coalition (s) will be worse off in the reduced problem.
Strong Merge-Proofness implies Merge-Proofness (see Gómez-Rúa and Vidal-Puga (2011)).
The following property considers the case in which one particular node splits into several nodes, producing a new situation with additional nodes.
Split-Proofness: For each Q ⊂ P \ {0}, we have
where q = r∈Q r (or P q = Pr∈Q P r ) and c 0q is the cost function defined by c 0q (i, j) = 0 for all i, j ∈ P q , and c 0q (i, j) = c(i, j) otherwise.
This property says that no node (q) has incentives to split into several nodes (Q).
Efficient Merging: If there exist two nodes r, s ∈ P\{0} such that c (r, s) =
where
This property says that if the closest nodes (r and s) are formed by agents, then they should find it optimal to merge. Hence, it avoids disincentives to construct an optimal network.
There exist some relations among these four last properties. Strong
Merge-Proofness implies Merge-Proofness (see Gómez-Rúa and Vidal-Puga Merging, then it also satisfies Split-Proofness.
Proof. Let Q ⊂ P \ {0}. We need to prove, under Strong Merge-Proofness and Efficient Merging, that Φ q ((P \ Q) ∪ {q}, c) ≤ r∈Q Φ r (P, c 0q ). We proceed by induction on |Q|, the cardinality of Q. For Q = {q}, it is clear that (P \ Q) ∪ {q} = P and, moreover, c = c 0q . Hence the result. Suppose now the result holds for |Q| < α with α > 1, and assume |Q| = α. Fix r ∈ Q and let
Merging, this is less of equal than
, and hence the result.
For the next property, given an order σ : {1, . . . , |E P |} −→ E P , we define
as the cone in R E P such that the ordering of the coordinates is given by σ. A real valued function F with domain R E P + is piece-wise additive if for any σ its restriction to C σ is additive, i.e. F (x + y) = F (x) + F (y) for all x, y ∈ C σ .
Piece-wise Additivity: Φ is piece-wise additive as a function with domain
This property provides a vector structure to Φ(P, c). The main advantage of a piece-wise additive cost sharing rule is that it is entirely determined by its value over the |E P |-coordinate vectors whose coordinates take exactly two values, one of them positive and the other zero (compare page 302 in Hougaard et al. (2010)).
For the last property, we define symmetric coalitions. Two coalitions r, s ∈ P \ {0} are symmetric in (P, c) if they have the same number of agents and, moreover, c (r, u) = c (s, u) for all u ∈ P \ {r, s}.
Symmetry: Symmetric coalitions pay the same.
A monotonic and merge-proof rule Definition of the rule
In order to define our rule, we need some additional notation. Given any t ∈ MT P and r, s ∈ P, let c (r, s) denote the maximum cost in the (unique) path between r and s in t. Formally, given {r 0 , . . . , r k } be the (unique) path between r = r 0 and s = r k in t, we define
This cost function c determines the irreducible matrix first defined by Bird (1976) in the context of minimum cost spanning tree problems. Even though the path depends on t, it is possible to show that c (r, s) is independent of the chosen t (see Aarts and Driessen (1993) ).
Let P = Pr∈P P r . Given any i ∈ P, let P i ∈ P such that i ∈ P i .
Given any t ∈ MT P and i, j ∈ P, let c (i, j) denote the maximum cost in the (unique) path between P i and P j in t. Formally, given {r 0 , ..., r k } be the (unique) path between P i = r 0 and P j = r k in t, we define c (i, j) = c (r 0 , r k ).
Notice that this definition implies c (i, j) = 0 when
Again, c (i, j) is independent of the chosen t.
Let Π P 0 denote the set of orderings of agents in P with 0 as first element. Namely, Π P 0 = π : 1, . . . , P −→ P : π biyective and π(1) = 0 .
Given π ∈ Π P 0 , we define Ψ π (P, c) ∈ R P\{0} inductively as follows:
for all l = 2, . . . , |P|.
We define Ψ(P, c) as follows. Given r ∈ P \ {0},
We now derive a simplified formula for Ψ. Let r π denote the first agent in P r for the order π. Then, Ψ π i (P, c) = 0 for all i ∈ P r \ {r π }. Analogously,
for all r ∈ P. From this, the definition of Ψ reduces to:
Example 4.1 Let P = {0, r, s} with P 0 = {0}, P r = {1, 2} and P s = {3}, In this situation there exists a unique mt, t = {(0, r), (r, s)}. 
Main characterization
We next prove that Ψ satisfies all the relevant properties (Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.2) and it is characterized by them (Theorem 4.2).
Theorem 4.1 Ψ satisfies Population Monotonicity, Solidarity, Strong MergeProofness, Efficient Merging, Piece-wise Additivity, and Symmetry.
Proof. We check first that Ψ satisfies Population Monotonicity. Fix r, s ∈ P \ {0}. For each π ∈ Π P 0 , let π −s be the order in P \ P s induced by π by removing the agents in coalition s. Moreover, P \ {s} = P \ P s . Now, for each ̟ ∈ Π P\Ps 0 , we have
Let α s denote this cardinal. Notice that α s does not depend on the particular ̟. Moreover, the maximum cost of a path between r and any other node cannot increase in we add new nodes. Hence, for each π ∈ Π P 0 , we have Ψ π r (P, c) ≤ Ψ π −s r (P \ {s}, c) and thus
We check now that Ψ satisfies Solidarity. Notice first that the maximum cost of a path between any pair of nodes cannot decrease when we increase the cost of some link, leaving the rest unaffected. Hence, for each π ∈ Π P 0 , Ψ π satisfies solidarity. Since Ψ is the average of these Ψ π , and the orders remain unaffected when a cost increases, we deduce that Ψ also satisfies Solidarity.
We check now that Ψ satisfies Strong Merge-Proofness. Notice that the maximum cost of a path between any pair of nodes cannot increase when some other nodes merge. Hence, for each π ∈ Π P 0 , Ψ π satisfies Strong MergeProofness. Since Ψ is the average of these Ψ π , and the orders remain unaffected when two or more coalitions merge, we deduce that Ψ also satisfies Strong Merge-Proofness.
We check now that Ψ satisfies Efficient Merging. Let r, s ∈ P be one of the closest pairs of coalitions. Let P rs = (P \ {r, s}) ∪ {r ∪ s}. Then, for any π ∈ Π P 0 satisfying that there exists some i ∈ P r with π(i) < π(j) for all j ∈ P s , we have
Let Π r the subset of these orderings. Analogously, let Π s be the subset of orders π ∈ Π P 0 satisfying that there exists some i ∈ P s with π(i) < π(j) for all j ∈ P r . It is clear that Π r ∩ Π s = ∅ and ΠP 0 = Π r ∪ Π s . Hence,
so that, taking into account that P = P rs , Ψ r (P, c) + Ψ s (P, c) = Ψ r∪s (P rs , c) + c (r, s) .
The "greater or equal" part of this equality constitutes the proof of Efficient Merging.
We check now that Ψ satisfies Piece-wise Additivity. Let c, c ′ be two cost functions on the same cone C σ . Hence, there exists a common mt t in both (P, c) and (P, c ′ ) and, moreover, t is also a mt in (P, c + c ′ ). From this, it follows that for any π ∈ Π P 0 ,
Since Ψ is the average of these Ψ π , we deduce that Ψ satisfies Piece-wise Additivity.
Finally, the proof that Ψ satisfies Symmetry follows from its definition.
A relevant implication of this result is that Ψ coincides with the folk solution in minimum cost spanning tree problems:
Proposition 4.1 Let (P, c) be such that |P r | = 1 for all r ∈ P. Then, Ψ(P, c) coincides with the folk rule of the minimum cost spanning tree problem P, c .
Proof. It follows from Theorem 1 in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2009) that the folk rule is the only one that satisfies Piece-wise Additivity, Symmetry and Separability, which is a weaker property than Population Monotonicity.
From Theorem 4.1, Ψ satisfies these properties and hence it coincides with the folk rule when |P r | = |P s | for all r, s ∈ P \ {0}.
From the proof of Proposition 4.1, it is clear that Ψ coincides with the folk rule when all the nodes contain the same number of agents. The result does not longer apply when these cardinalities are different, because in that case the nodes cannot be symmetric.
Notice that Ψ satisfies a stronger version of Piece-wise Additivity. In particular, Ψ is piece-wise linear as a function with domain R E P . This allow us to characterize Ψ by providing its value for any c with c(i, j) ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j. We do it now. Let c 01 be such a cost function.
For any (P, c 01 ), the total cost is m(P, c 01 ) = |P| − 1, where P is the partition of P in connected components. For each R ∈ P, let R = r∈R P r be the set of agents that form R. It is then straightforward to check that Ψ is characterized by:
for all r ∈ P \ {0}.
We now provide a necessary condition for Merge-Proofness and Efficient
Merging.
Proposition 4.2 If Φ satisfies Strong Merge-Proofness and Efficient Merging, then
for all r ∈ P, where P * = {{i}} i∈P and c * is defined as c
Proof. Let Φ be a rule that satisfies Strong Merge-Proofness and Efficient
Merging. We proceed by induction on |P|. For |P| = 2, we have P = {r, 0}
and c * ({i}, {j}) = 0 for all i, j ∈ P r . Thus,
Assume now |P| > 2 and the result holds when there are less than |P| coalitions. The result also holds trivially when |P r | = 1 for all r ∈ P. Hence, assume there exists some r ∈ P with |P r | > 1. Since c * ({i}, {j}) = 0 for all i, j ∈ P r , we can apply Efficient Merging sequentially on each i ∈ P r to obtain i∈Pr
where P * r = (P * \ {{i}} i∈Pr ) ∪ {r}. Now,
where the second inequality comes from Strong Merge-Proofness. Combining (2) and (3), we see that all weak inequalities are equalities, and in particular:
Corollary 4.1 Solidarity, Merge-Proofness, Efficient Merging and Symmetry imply Positivity.
Proof. Let Φ be a rule satisfying these properties. By Proposition 4.2,
where c 0 (i, j) = 0 for all i, j. Under Symmetry, Φ(P * , c 0 ) = (0, . . . , 0) and hence Φ(P, c) ≥ (0, . . . , 0). We now present our main result:
Theorem 4.2 Ψ is the only rule that satisfies Population Monotonicity, Solidarity, Strong Merge-Proofness, Efficient Merging, Piece-wise Additivity, and Symmetry.
Proof. We already know that Ψ satisfies all these properties. Let Φ be a rule that satisfies them. Under Corollary 4.1, Φ also satisfies Positivity. We will prove that Φ is unique for each (P, c). We proceed by induction on the number coalitions in P. If |P| = 1, the result is trivial. Assume then that the result is true when there are less than |P| coalitions.
Under Strong Merge-proofness and Efficient Merging, by Proposition 4.2 it is enough to prove the result assuming |P r | = 1 for all r ∈ P.
Under Piece-wise Additivity, it is enough to prove the result assuming that c only takes two values: 0 and some x ∈ R + . To see why, notice that every (P, c) can be expressed as the sum of these situations, all of them in the same cone C σ for some σ satisfying c(σ
Under Population Monotonicity and the induction hypothesis, we can assume that there exists a spanning graph g in P \ {P 0 } such that c (r, s) = 0 for all (r, s) ∈ g. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exist two groups of coalitions Q, Q ′ ⊂ P such that Q ∪ Q ′ = P and c(r, r ′ ) = x for all r ∈ Q and r ′ ∈ Q ′ . Then Population Monotonicity implies that Φ r (Q, c) ≥ Φ r (P, c)
for all r ∈ Q and Φ r (Q ′ , c) ≥ Φ r (P, c) for all r ∈ Q ′ . Moreover, it is straightforward to check that m(P, c) = m(Q, c) + m(Q ′ , c). Hence, given r ∈ Q (the case r ∈ Q ′ is analogous),
and so Φ r (P, c) = Φ r (Q, c), which is unique by induction hypothesis.
Under Positivity, it is enough to prove the result assuming that c(r, 0) = x for all r ∈ P \ {0}. Suppose, on the contrary, that c(r, 0) = 0 for some r ∈ P \ {0}. Hence, m(P, c) = 0 because g ∪{(r, 0)} is a spanning graph with cost 0. Under Positivity, Φ(P, c) ≥ (0, . . . , 0) but since s∈P\{0} Φ s (P, c) = m(P, c) = 0, we conclude that Φ(P, c) = (0, . . . , 0).
Clearly, under these assumptions we have m(P, c) = x. Assume w.l.o.g. P = {0, 1, . . . , p}. In particular, this implies P = {{0}, {1}, . . . , {p}}. Let c 0x be the cost function defined as c 0x (r, 0) = x for all r ∈ P \ {0} and c 0x (r, s) = 0 otherwise. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, let P r ⊂ P be the set of nodes whose (unique) path to the source in g uses node i (including node i itself), and let P s = P \ P r \ {0}. Both sets P r and P s can be connected at zero cost. Hence, under Efficient Merging and Strong Merge-Proofness, we
Under Symmetry, Φ {j} (P, c 0x ) = x p for all j ∈ P. Hence, j∈Pr Φ {j} (P, c) = x|Pr| p
. We can now proceed by induction on |P r | in order to prove that
. For |P r | = 1, we have P r = {i} and hence Φ {i} (P, c) = when |P r | < α and suppose |P r | = α. Then,
Notice, from the proof of Theorem 4.2, that we can replace Solidarity by Positivity in the characterization result. In either case, the properties are independent, as we show in the next subsection.
Independence of the properties
We present six reasonable rules that satisfy the properties used in Theorem 4.2 but one.
Without Piece-wise Additivity: Let F e be defined as cost that agents in S should face after they get connected, and e is normalized extra-cost function that assigns to each irreducible cost function c a vector in the simplex ∆ S . See Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2015) for a detailed interpretation of these terms. Let M(c, S) = {i ∈ S : c(i, j) ≤ c(k, j) for all j, k ∈ S} be the set of agents that are closer under c within S. When e is defined as
e is a cost-sharing rule that satisfies all the properties but Piecewise Additivity. In Example 4.1, F e (P, c) = (12, 6).
The rest of the rules are piece-wise linear, and hence it is enough to define them for any c 01 with c 01 (i, j) ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j (as in (1)).
For any (P, c 01 ) and r ∈ P \ {0}, let Λ r ⊂ P be the set of agents that belong to either r or to some s such that there exists a path between r and s with zero cost. Let λ r = |{s ∈ Λ r : c 01 (s, 0) = 0}| be the number of nodes in Λ r with zero cost to the source. It is not difficult to check that P r ⊂ S 0 if and only if λ r > 0.
Without Symmetry: Given π ∈ Π N , we consider Ψ π . In Example 4.1, if
Without Population Monotonicity: Given α ∈ (0, 1), let Φ α be defined
for all r ∈ P \ {0}, where R ∈ P is such that P r ∈ R. This Φ α is a subsidy rule where the cost of connection of the nodes that are far away from the source in term of costs (those in P \S 0 ) are partially subsidized by the nodes that are closer. In Example 4.1, Φ α (P, c) = (11, 7). Notice that it coincides with Ψ(P, c). In this example, there are no nodes far away from the source (with respect to the others). Assume now that there exists a third node P u = {4} with c(0, u) = c(r, u) = c(s, u) = 20 for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Then, Φ α (P, c) = 11 + 10α 3
, 7 + 5α 3
, 20 − 5α whereas Ψ(P, c) = (11, 7, 20) .
Without Solidarity: Let Φ λ be defined by for all r ∈ P \{0}. When there are coalitions that connect to the source through a unique node, they should pay a compensation to this node.
In Example 4.1, Φ λ (P, c) = (10, 8).
Without Efficient Merging: Let Φ 2 be defined by
for all r ∈ P \ {0}. In Example 4.1, Φ 2 (P, c) = (12.6, 5.4).
Without Strong Merge-Proofness: LetΦ be defined bỹ
for all r ∈ P \ {0}. This rule is similar to Ψ, but averaging on the different orders of coalitions, instead of agents. It is equivalent to the folk rule when the size of the nodes is not taken into account. In Example 4.1,Φ(P, c) = (9, 9).
The rule as a weighted Shapley value
Another remarkable implication of the characterization result is that Ψ can be defined as a the weighted Shapley value of an appropriate transfer utility (TU) cost game.
For each (P, c), consider the TU cost game (P \ {0}, v + ) defined as v + (R) = m R ∪ {0}, c R for all R ⊂ P \ {0}, where c R (r, s) = c(r, s) for all r, s ∈ R, and c R (r, 0) = min s∈P\R c(r, s) for all r ∈ R.
This TU cost game was first defined by Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007b) . It follows an "optimistic" interpretation of the worth of a coalition of players, since it assumes that the rest of the players are already connected and it is possible to get to the source through them.
Example 5.1 Consider (P, c) defined in Example 4.1. The TU cost game ({r, s}, v + ) is given by v + ({r}) = v + ({s}) = 3 and v + ({r, s}) = 18.
We now interpret Ψ as a weighted Shapley value of this TU cost game:
Proposition 5.1 For any (P, c), Ψ(P, c) is the weighted Shapley value of the TU cost game (P \ {0}, v + ) where the weights are given by ω r = |P r | for each r ∈ P \ {0}.
Proof. Let c 01 be a cost function with c(i, j) ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j. Since the weighted Shapley value is linear in the characteristic function, it is enough to prove that it coincides with Ψ(P, c 01 ) for each such c 01 . It is clear that the TU cost game (P \ {0}, v + ) associated with c 01 is given by
where u R is the unanimity game with carrier R, i.e. u R (S) = 1 if R ⊂ S and u R (S) = 0 otherwise. Moreover, by definition of the weighted Shapley value (as defined by Kalai and Samet (1987) ), if r ∈ R ∈ P \ {S 0 }
for all r ∈ P \ {0}. It is clear that r / ∈ R∈P\{S 0 } R iff r ∈ S 0 and, by definition, ω r = |P r | and s∈R ω s = s∈R |P s | = R . Hence, the right-part of (1) and (4) coincide, so Ψ(P, c 01 ) = Sh ω (P \ {0}, v + ). Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007b) proved that the folk rule coincides with the Shapley value of the optimistic TU cost game. From this, Proposition 4.1 can also be derived from Proposition 5.1.
Conclusions
In the classical model of minimum cost spanning tree problems, it is assumed that the planner is not able to distinguish who are the agents that belong to each node. In many situations, such as those in which the agents are represented by geographical points, it seems reasonable that the planner can identify how many agents may belong to the same node. This assumption is very reasonable in the particular case of minimum cost spanning tree problems, where it is common knowledge that all the nodes want to be connected to the source. Given this, we study three classes of properties for a rule to satisfy. These classes are related to core selection, cost monotonicity and split and merge-proofness, respectively. While in the classical model there is no rule satisfying merge-proofness, here we propose one satisfying the three classes of properties. We also provide a characterization using symmetry, piece-wise additivity and several variations of core selection, cost monotonicity and split and merge-proofness. Symmetry is an important property from the point of view of equity. On the other hand, we do not claim that piecewise additivity is an essential property, but it provides a linear structure to the solution and, as such, it allows us to pick up a single reasonable rule.
